Introduction

Our political parties behave as if they operate outside the laws of contract and natural justice. There is a reason for that behaviour. Much of the laws of the Commonwealth and the states do not apply to our parties.

Yes, Australia has free and democratic elections, enshrined in law with an independent statutory authority, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) responsible for the conduct of Federal elections. Australia does not suffer the corruption sanctioned by statute that is taken for granted in the USA. The second enactment of the Commonwealth Parliament when it assembled in May 1901 was a uniform electoral act to replace the six regimes of colonial law that governed the first elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Our electoral officials are public servants and personnel employed at election times. All officials are bound by laws that require them to ensure every citizen is enrolled and will have every opportunity to cast a vote. In the USA officials and their overseers are political operatives, laws are framed to exclude voters hostile to the hegemony, polling places are inconvenient or do not exist for the hostile.

Australia is free from corrupt vote buying activities. Strict laws govern the eligibility of voters, the integrity of the voters roll and the honesty of the count and its tally. The first point of departure in Australia is to establish the will of the voter. In the USA it is to admit or exclude votes depending on how they are cast.

Political parties have been able to insulate themselves against even their own membership because they in receipt in tax payer election funding, a quantum in the tens of millions of dollars.

The *Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918* laws governs the integrity of Federal Elections and the drawing up of electoral boundaries on the basis of one vote one value. No law ensures that democracy or the rule of law applies to the internal governance of political parties in receipt of tax payer largesse.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal framework with respect to the rule of law in our political parties with respect to their internal governance. For the purpose of this paper I concentrate on the Federal jurisdiction rather than the States.

Australia has had universal adult suffrage since its Federation in 1901, making it one of the world's oldest democracies, whilst conversely being one of the youngest of the

world's nations. In 1901, the date Australia's Federation came into existence, the United Kingdom, United States and much of Europe - such as France and Germany had not granted adult women the right to vote, or to stand for parliamentary election. In many other countries the right to vote in free elections by men only, was either not permitted or based on a restricted franchise.

In Australia also there was a lack of democracy in the election of State Upper Houses of Parliament. It was not until 1975 that the Legislative Council in South Australia was elected for the first time on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Until then the Legislative Council was elected on a restricted franchise, by excluding tenants in public and private dwellings from the voters roll. Until 1970 the boundaries drawn for the House of Assembly seats were subject to mal apportionment as between the metropolitan area of Adelaide which had 13 seats representing 75% of the State's population and 26 seats representing the country and regional centres of the State with 25% of the population.

Both the Liberal Party and the Labor Party are today led federally by men who owe their passage into the Federal Parliament by being experts in the art of branch stacking **and using party rules to their advantage. Stacking is the effort required to** enrol very large numbers of persons into membership of their respective party in the electorate coveted, (and who it is alleged had little if any affinity to the principles or policies of those parties' as well as having had their membership fees paid for by someone(s) other than themselves).

Malcolm Turnbull deposed a one term Liberal member of parliament, Peter King in 2004 by winning the Liberal Party preselection for the safe Liberal seat of Wentworth, with media reports at the time reporting on **thousands** of new members of the Liberal Party being signed up in Wentworth. **There were allegedly 5000 members in Point Piper, Sydney's most exclusive and expensive suburb.** Nothing like 5000 people live in Point Piper. The Liberal Party does not have rules of residence, the Labor Party does, a requirement overcome by falsifying addresses.

Bill Shorten deposed the sitting Labor member for Maribyrnong, Bob Sercombe, in 2006 by forcing him to retire after the ALP membership in his seat increased exponentially in the run-up to the preselection ballot. Shorten and his supporters had engaged in a vigorous branch stacking exercise which proved a successful exercise on his part. Shorten supporters controlled the key party committees on (i) disputes resolution and (ii) the central preselect ion panel. Turnbull did not control the external machinery. The Liberal Party is capable of disinterested quasi-judicial review, the Labor Party is not. (For an in depth report on the workings of the Liberal Party in NSW read "Confessions of a Young Liberal, by John Hyde Page)

Given the histories of both Turnbull and Shorten it is unlikely that Australia is going to see any reforms made to our laws with respect to the internal governance of political parties whilst they remain leaders of their parties. Perhaps one needs a "poacher" turned "gamekeeper" to get it done. **The US Stock Exchange was reformed after the collapse of 1929 because Joseph Kennedy, the great market manipulator of his era and father of a future President, was asked by Roosevelt to advise on reforms.** Kennedy made recommendations that outlawed emulating his standard practices – and made it impossible for anyone to emulate him *inside the law*.

Before I turn my attention to the current situation with respect to the law governing political parties (or the lack thereof), I briefly review how our Parliaments deal with the rights of members of incorporated associations and of registered Trade Unions under the *Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act, 2009.*

Incorporated Associations

None of the major parties represented in the Federal Parliament are incorporated associations. They are simply non incorporated associations with a voluntary membership. As such they are not bound by the association incorporation laws of the various States and Territories.

In SA, incorporated Associations come within the purview of the *Associations Incorporation Act 1985*. That Act, does like all other jurisdictions, provide that the rules and constitutions of incorporated associations must be upheld. Section 40 of the Act states that in any dispute between the association and its members the rules of natural justice must be observed. Section 61 of the Act, deals with "oppressive or unreasonable acts". This section gives significant powers to the Supreme Court of SA in adjudicating disputes between members and the association on matters such as the expulsion of a member (s), or actions which are oppressive or unreasonable or discriminatory against a member(s), or the rules of the association contain or are proposed to be altered so that they will contain provisions which are oppressive or unreasonable.

In the matter of *Pettit v SA Harness Racing Club Inc & Ors, 2006 SASC 306* dated 5th October 2006 Mr Justice White gave his decision on a dispute between certain members of the association and the majority view of the committee. The Club as at 25th July 2006 had 409 members, including 100 life or honorary members. The committee elections were to be held in September 2006. Between the 20–25 July 2006 a total of 266 applications were received from persons wishing to join the club, many of the applications were recognised as being persons who were employees of another trainer and that they had all been proposed for membership by their employer, some 60 persons. To become a member of the association a person's application had to be accepted by the committee of management. The majority of committee members on the night of their meeting, 25th July 2006 considered only

one application. All other applicants, en bloc were not considered for membership until after the then forthcoming committee elections.

Justice White ruled against the majority committee decision as their actions were contrary to the rules, where even though they may have had suspicions as to the bone fides of the applicants they had not done what the rules required of them which were to consider each application separately and consider honestly, the merits of each application. His Honour said at paragraph 64 of his judgement:

It is understandable that the receipt of a large number of applications for membership late in the membership year, and only just before the last scheduled Committee meeting before at which persons could be admitted to membership in time to vote in the committee elections.....would naturally give rise to suspicions amongst committee members acting reasonably that some at least of the applicants were seeking membership for the sole purpose of participating in the committee elections , rather than because of any underlying interest in harness racing......and at paragraph 65, "It was, however inappropriate for the committee to apply an inflexible rule to all the applications. Not all the applications had to be treated with the same suspicion."

In another case, *Popovic & Ors, v Transijevic & ors (#5) [2000] SASC 87* – Dated 31^{ST} March 2000, Justice Olsson had to rule on a dispute concerning the Serbian Community Welfare Association of SA Inc. Justice Olsson "distilled" the dispute under 10 headings,(paragraph 498) which included allegations of "meetings not being lawfully convened, ineligible parties had been unlawfully admitted to membership, the chairperson had conducted meetings in an arrogant, autocratic and undemocratic fashion and membership records had been falsified . . ." These allegations would not be out of place to describe a number of disputes within political parties.

His Honour in his judgement went on to describe the importance of s61 (7) of the Associations Incorporation Act, (paragraph 505) as

The very provisions of s 61 (7) reveal the importance which the legislature attaches to the proper adherence to the provisions of the Constitution and Rules of an incorporated association. This is because a failure to observe such provisions has the effect of depriving members of their right as members, to have the affairs of the entity conducted in accordance with its Constitution and Rules (cf *Re HR Hammer Ltd [1959 1 WLR 62 AT 84*). Justice Olsson went on to state, at paragraph 509: "It cannot be a situation that the end justified the means. The lawful members of the SCWA are entitled to have the association administered properly and according to law".

The Supreme Court in SA has been invested by the State Parliament with respect to incorporated associations, very broad powers to intervene in the internal governance of those associations, to ensure natural justice and the application of the rule of law in upholding an associations Constitution and Rules, including, power to overturn oppressive or unreasonable acts by one group of members over another. No such corresponding powers have been granted by any Parliament in Australia to apply those same rules to the internal governance of political parties.

Trade Unions and Registration

Organisations, both employee unions and employer unions are eligible to be registered under the *Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act, 2009.* Registration, particularly for trade unions confers significant benefits to those unions. It provides exclusive membership coverage of a raft of occupations, industries or callings to particular unions. It allows those unions to speak on behalf of all workers, whether union members or not in those industries that they cover, in respect of wages and conditions, the granting of permits to enter into employer premises to investigate working conditions and rates of pay etc and to participate in lawful strikes or other forms of industrial action subject to approval from the Fair Work Commission.

In return the union movement accept that society, represented by the Federal Parliament has the right to ensure that registered organisations must have a constitution and rules that govern their affairs which provide for secret postal ballots for union elections conducted by the AEC, periodic elections of not more than 4 yearly intervals, that their financial statements must be independently audited and made available to the Fair Work Commission and published to its members at least annually and that the governing bodies of those unions must be democratic and that they may not pass resolutions or amendments to their rules which are oppressive, unreasonable or unjust with respect to a member (s).

Section 5 (3) of the Act, under the heading, "PARLIAMENT'S INTENTION IN ENACTING THIS ACT" sets out the standards that the Parliament has set for registered organisations, they include the following.

- "(a) ensure that employer and employee organisations registered under this Act are representative of and accountable to their members, and are able to operate effectively; and
- (b) encourage members to participate in the affairs of organisations to which they belong; and
- (d) provide for the democratic functioning and control of organisations;"

Section 142 of the Act deals with the general requirements for the rules of organisations, including the following.

"(c) must not impose on applicants for membership, or members, of the organisation, conditions, obligations or restrictions, that having regard to Parliament's intentions in enacting this Act, (see section 5) and the objects of this Act and the Fair Work Act, are oppressive, unreasonable or unjust . . . "

Internal disputes between member(s) and registered organisations are dealt with by the Industrial Division of the Federal Court of Australia. Since the insertion into the objects of

the Act,(particularly since their inclusion in the former *Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904*, in 1973 by the Minister for Labour in the Whitlam government, Clyde Cameron) re democratic control by members over their union and the legislation dealing with unjust or oppressive rules or decisions of an organisation's governing bodies, the Federal Court has handed down numerous decisions as to what constitutes democratic provisions in union rules and what unjust or oppressive actions constitute.

This paper does not intend to study those decisions, other than to point out that the Federal Court through the body of decisions it has made, has laid down the guidance that unions need to be aware of, as to what constitute undemocratic forms of governance and what constitutes unjust or oppressive acts.

Neither the Federal Court nor the legislation defines what democratic rules must be in place for each union, or the meaning of oppressive, unreasonable or unjust. It is not a one size fits all; each case is treated on the merits of the evidence that is given in each case.

However, the most important section of the Act, which helps ensure the rule of law in trade unions, is 324. It provides that the Minister, "may on application authorise payment by the Commonwealth to a person of financial assistance in relation to the whole or part of the person's relevant costs if the Minister is satisfied:

- (a) That hardship is likely to be caused to the person if the application is refused; and
- (b) That in all the circumstances it is reasonable that the application should be granted."

The section then goes on to outline the grounds the person may make for such an application, which includes, election disputes, a person's entitlement to become and remain a member of the union, unjust or oppressive rules or actions by a governing body of the union towards a member (s).

Section 324 is vital to the internal governance of any union registered under the Act. It gives an aggrieved member (s) the opportunity to have their case heard in a Court of Law. A Court with the power to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done. Without access to legal aid, ordinary members would have no ability or capacity to engage the legal advice and representation to be able to effectively make their case and ensure the rule of law.

Ironically, whilst both Liberal and Labor Federal Governments impose on trade unions, for good public policy reasons, laws governing their internal governance, they will not follow suit with respect to the governance of their own parties.

Political Parties

It is now accepted law that the rules and constitutions of unincorporated political parties, (registered pursuant to the *Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918*) are justiciable in the relevant Supreme Court. This was not always the case. Until the early 1990s the justiciability of political parties rules was treated in accordance with the decision of the High Court in the matter of "*Cameron v Hogan* [1934] HCA 24; (1934 51 CLR 358". In that case Mr Hogan, Labor Premier of Victoria 1929 – 1932 fell foul of the ALP Federal Executive and its Victorian Branch over his support for the Premiers plan of 1931 regarding reductions in wages and pensions during the Great Depression. Hogan brought proceedings before the Supreme Court of Victoria against officers of the ALP, an unincorporated association alleging certain decisions – principally his expulsion from the ALP - by the Victorian central executive were contrary to the party's constitution. The Supreme Court upheld Hogan's claim for damages but it was dismissed on appeal to the High Court. The High Court held that the rules of the party did not operate to create enforceable contractual rights and duties between members, or between executive officers and members.

With the introduction of public funding for political parties in their election campaigns by the Federal Parliament in 1988, the Courts have drawn a distinction between the Hogan case of 1934 and the situation today with the public funding of political parties, giving rise to the public interest in ensuring that the rules and constitutions of those parties are upheld. In a case before the Supreme Court of NSW decided on 6th July 2007 in the matter of; *"Coleman v. Liberal Party of Australia , NSW Division (No.2) [2007] NSWSC 736*, the Court traversed a number of legal cases involving internal disputes within political parties - *Baldwin v Everingham [1993] 1 Qd R 10* and *"Clarke v ALP (SA Branch) [1999] SASC 365, Mullighan J*, as well as a number of other cases which are cited at paragraphs 36 – 40, of the judgement.

His Honour at paragraph 40 said, "In *Clarke v Australian Labor Party* (supra) Mullighan J reviewed extensively the authorities and legislation upon which the decision in Baldwin v Everingham was founded and concluded that the decision was correct. With respect, I too consider it to be correct and I apply it in the present case hold that the issues which the parties have contested are justiciable".

His Honour made the point that not every justiciable issue arising out of the construction of the rules will necessarily lead a Court to grant the discretionary remedies of declaratory relief and injunctive relief, where members of a voluntary association submit under the rules to a final determination of disputes by a domestic tribunal. In the Coleman case, which dealt with a preselection dispute he rejected the submission of the Liberal Party NSW Division that the dispute should have been kept in house rather than aired in the Courts, as the Party had an internal disputes panel to determine such disputes.

In rejecting the party's submission His Honour noted that the Liberal Party itself had recognised the rights of a person to approach the Court and at paragraph 47 of his decision stated:

This concession recognises, I think the reality that certain decisions of a political party's internal process – such as those relating to selection of candidates for election, for example – are in truth not private matters at all: they are very public, particularly when there are disputes between factions. In such circumstances, a political party may regard it as highly expedient in order to quell faction – fighting that the final decision on the constitutional validity of its internal proceedings be left, not to a domestic tribunal constituted by party members whose impartiality may, however unjustly, be called into question.

At paragraph 48 His Honour further says:

Judges have called attention to the fact that a modern political party registered under the legislation governing elections is in itself an institution whose internal stability and good governance is important in the democratic process: e.g. Baldwin v Everingham at p.17.5. Accordingly, there is a public interest in ensuring that a registered political party, which is entitled to funding assistance for electoral expenses from public monies, is administered in accordance with a correct construction of its rules: (authorities cited). [my emphasis]

The Problem - notwithstanding the justiciability of political party's rules and constitution

Whilst it is clear that in the various jurisdictions the Supreme Court have power to ensure the observing by political parties of their rules. The Courts do not have the power to strike down rules of political parties so as to ensure the parties are democratic, that they operate on the basis of one member, one vote, or that the rules and constitutions of a political party and / or resolutions carried by their governing bodies operate in a manner which are not oppressive, **unreasonable** or unjust. Members of a political party do not have access to a legal aid fund which would permit them to challenge the actions of the governing faction in either the construction of the rules and constitution or in the operation of those rules.

In relation to costs, in my own case of Clarke v the ALP, my legal costs in September 1999 was \$80,000, the costs of the ALP would have been at least on a similar scale. Had I not won my case and received costs, (of which I was reimbursed \$60,000 – the Medicare gap of the legal fraternity) I would have been liable for my own costs and that of the ALP. In today's dollar terms that would be at least equal to \$320,000-\$360,000. In NSW those legal costs would be double those amounts. Such financial risks virtually guarantee that members of political parties will rarely dispute breaches of their party's rules and constitution, or challenge whether the rules are democratic or unjust or oppressive.

Existing rules of political parties.

From my examination of the rules of the registered political parties by the Australian Electoral Commission the following emerges;

- 1. The AEC itself will not provide any member of the public with a copy of the rules and constitution of registered political parties. The AEC regard them as private and will only do so if permission is granted by the parties themselves or via a FOI request. An odd situation given that these same political parties receive courtesy of the tax payer, **tens of** millions of dollars in campaign funding after every Federal Election.
- 2. I used the website and found that a number of the parties had copies of their constitution and rules on their website. I am assuming they are up to date. The rules varied between preselection of candidates being determined; by a mixture of rank and file members voting in the electorate concerned, or by a selection panel with various weightings being given between the vote of the local rank and file members and members selected by a central panel, e.g. the branch or division executive. In almost in all cases preselection of Senate or Legislative Council candidates in the States was done at a central level, by a State Convention or State Council delegates.
- 3. The ALP, the party I am most familiar with has by far the most centralised procedure of pre selecting candidates. Whilst it varies between States, from theoretically 100% local plebiscites in NSW for lower House seats to only a 25% local content in SA (increased to 33% post 2018 State Election) and WA with the remaining 75% comprising 50% trade union affiliates and the remaining 25% being drawn from the other lower house state electorate delegates to State Conventions. In Victoria and Tasmania the local rank and file vote is 50% and the central component on the preselection panels are delegates elected at the party's State Convention where the union vote is decisive in electing the successful preselectors.

In so far as electing candidates for the Senate or Legislative Council the pre selections are done at a central level with little if any real influence exerted by rank and file members, except in Tasmania where the rank file vote is 50%.

4. The ALP preselection rules are the least democratic of any of the major political parties. The union vote of 50% means in reality 100% control of the party, as the unions, notwithstanding their nominal left, right allegiances in fact collude and distribute the safe/ comfortable "green and red leather seats" between them on a feudal like basis.

The union affiliated bloc vote is vastly disproportionate to the actual numbers of unionists in the Australian workforce, which is less than **15**% if you exclude public sector union members. The numbers of unionists, who are members of

ALP affiliated unions, represent less than 10 % of the Australian workforce and **about 4 per cent of the electorate**. The percentage of rank and file union members who are also members of the ALP in their own right is so negligible as to be embarrassing. The union delegates to ALP conventions are rarely elected by and from the rank and file union membership; they are usually selected by the respective union secretary. **Union delegations consist of fellow office bearers, employees of the union and operatives supplied by the faction the union secretary supports. It is extremely rare to have a worker in a union delegation to an ALP conference. The delegation votes** as a bloc.

5. Trade Unions that are affiliated have never, at least in living memory had a ballot of their membership to determine if (a) they want the union to be affiliated at all and (b) whether they want to be included in the number of union members their union affiliates to the ALP for. The one exception I know of was my own union the Federated Clerks' Union SA Branch when in 1987 the union conducted a secret postal ballot of all financial members by the State Electoral Commission, on the question of affiliating to the ALP, where 57% voted yes out of a voter turnout of 40%.

Is it possible that the 22,000 members of the Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (known as the "Shoppies Union") in SA who affiliate to the ALP for its full membership are 100% in support of the ALP and its policies? Most unlikely! The Transport Workers Union NSW Branch has recently been subject to being taken to the Federal Court over the issue of allegedly inflating membership numbers to secure a political advantage in ALP internal party matters, by inflating their numbers they secured 43 delegates to the ALP NSW conference instead of 23 delegates. At the time of writing that case has still to be heard.

6. It is well known that in all the major parties, there has been branch stacking. This widespread abuse is perpetuated in all major political parties. It has been the source of virtually all disputes that have gone before the various State Supreme Courts involving both of the two major parties, cited in this paper.

In my own case that went before Mullighan J in 1999, the ALP SA Branch saw its membership increase on Australia Day 1999 from 3500 to 5500 members. 1999 was the biennial election year of State Conference delegates to State Convention which was the body that preselected candidates for the following State Election and for the Federal House of Representatives and Senators.

The evidence of a number of those new members advised that they had not signed the membership applications, nor paid the membership fee, rather the person who did sign them up said the money would be paid by someone else and some claimed they supported the Liberal Party rather than the ALP. Evidence before Justice Mullighan showed that the fees for the 2,000 new members were paid for by 6 cheques in payment of all membership fees, with 90% of those claiming a concessional fee.

All of these irregularities were advised to the then State Secretary (now the Minister for Environment in SA, Ian Hunter) by myself and others, nothing was done, the matter went to the State Executive and nothing was done, I took the matter to the National Executive and nothing was done, then I went to the Supreme Court of SA out of desperation to have the rules of the Party enforced.

Conclusion

Sadly, little if anything will be done by the political parties to have their affairs regulated like a registered trade union or an incorporated association. It is not in the interests of the factional warlords in the two major parties to do anything. Better for the Liberal Party to try and taint the ALP as being beholden to the union movement, than ensure democracy at the grass roots for ALP members. In addition the Liberal factional war lords know that if they did something to "democratise" the ALP rules, then the same principle would be applied to them. The ALP powerbrokers are just happy to decide for themselves just what is good for the membership of the Party.

Australia has seen how this coterie has operated in the public interest. In NSW the ALP disgraced itself with the rampant corruption of former State Ministers and their allies, who used their positions in the party to earn millions of dollars at public expense.

The Liberal Party in NSW also has problems. In less than four years of the O'Farrell Liberal government returning to power after 16 years in opposition, a dozen or more sitting Liberal Members of Parliament, Ministers of the Crown and the Premier himself, either being stood down, resigned or found to have accepted via the "back door," campaign donations from property developers which is illegal under NSW electoral laws, as a result of the public hearings and findings of the Independent Commission Against Corruption.

In addition allegations have been made by former PM Abbott recently, publicly attacking unnamed **but easily identified** powerbrokers in his party **who are highly paid lobbyists for clients who need favourable decisions from ministers and cabinets dependent on the influence of those lobbyists in preselection panels.**

I suspect that whilst the corruption in NSW has been rampant, not dissimilar corruption would exist in other jurisdictions, except in NSW their ICAC have broader powers in relation to public hearings which allow the public to know of the corruption in their State. It will take revelations of the type involving the Obeid Macdonald corruption scandals in NSW to be replicated in the Federal sphere before either the media or the general public pay heed for the need to establish the rule of law in political parties in Australia.

The media itself will not do the job. **Reporters and analysts** have been emasculated by the downturn in readership. **There has been a** huge loss of talent amongst investigative journalists. Media owners want to stay sweet with the political establishment, sensible given the ownership statutes that govern the media in Australia.

In a decision of the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) on appeal from the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division [2016] EWCA Civ 817 given on 12th August 2016, in relation to an appeal by the British Labour Party's National Executive against 5 members of the Party who had won at first instance against a ruling of the National Executive imposing a retrospective "freeze date" with respect to which of its members, supporters and affiliated trade unions had the right to vote in the 2016 election of the Parliamentary Leader. The Appeal Bench (Beatson, Macur, and Scales LJJJs') found that the Labour Party, whilst an unincorporated association was, "governed by the law of contract", (paragraphs 19 & 20) and its rules and constitution "is governed by the legal principles as to the interpretation of contracts, and is a matter of law for the courts".

In upholding the appeal by the National Executive of the Labour Party the Lord Justices observed that on a review of the authorities,

"..... concerning the control of the exercise of discretion on a party under a contract that the decision - maker's discretion will be limited to, as a matter of necessary implication, by concepts of honesty, good faith, and genuineness, and the need for the absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity and irrationality. The concern is that the discretion should not be abused......" (paragraph 47)

In the 1990s Australian Courts took a giant step forward **by** overcoming the Cameron and Hogan decision of the High Court of 1934. The above English Appeal Court's decision is at variance with the Hogan decision, which decided that the rules of the party as an unincorporated association did not operate to create enforceable contractual rights and duties between members, or between executive officers and members.

Perhaps our best and last hope are the Courts themselves; that they will act in defence of the public interest, once presented with the right case and evidence of the absence of honesty, good faith and genuineness etc, in the decision making of the governing bodies of our political parties.

Ralph Clarke

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Former Deputy Leader of the PLP SA, 1994 – 1997.

2nd September 2016.