Engaging Parliament through the Use of Internet Plebiscites


Norm Kelly

ASPG Conference
Wellington
1 October 2015


Engaging through Internet Plebiscites

- New Zealand voting trends
- Support for online voting and use overseas
- 2016 Local Government election trial
- Where Parliament fits
- Choosing a new flag
- Challenges and opportunities


NZ General Election Turnout 1981 – 2014




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
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
NZ Local Election Turnout 2004 – 2013



NZ Local Election Turnout 2004 – 2013




Access to the Internet



Support for Internet Voting

Would an online ballot box system make you more likely to vote?



Overseas Experiences of Online Voting

The Good

Not so Good

France

Estonia (after a poor start)

Switzerland

Norway

Netherlands

United Kingdom

United States

Spain

New South Wales 2015

Overseas Experiences of Online Voting

Thousands of NSW election online votes open to tampering

March 23, 2015 6,17am AEDT



VOTE RECEIPT

Thank you for using the iVote® for Web demonstration system. Your practise vote is complete and the demonstration Receipt Number is:

3111 6228 8894



Security Threats for Online Voting

Online Voting Threat Actors

Actor Type		Automated Attacks	Targets of opportunity	Publicity seekers	Security motivated	Political manipulation
Objecti	ive	Automatic malware systems that scan the internet for vulnerable hosts to infect.	Searching for vulnerable systems to compromise for personal gain.	Compromising a system to gain publicity for political or personal motivations.	Specifically targeting the online voting system to prove online voting should not be progressed.	Targeting the online voting system to manipulate the results of a political election.
Targete	ed	×	\leq	$ \mathbf{Y} $	Y	~
Charac	ter	Automated	Opportunistic	Opportunistic	Divergent	Political

NZ Local Government Online Voting Trial 2016

Online Voting Working Party

- Feasible a natural extension of existing options
- Can improve the voting experience
- Particularly useful for overseas, disabled, remote

But warned

- Staged implementation
- Public trust and confidence critical
- Security critical, but not easy

Bug bounty – constructive analysis of system vulnerability

NZ Local Government Online Voting Trial 2016

How the Trial Works

- Up to 10 local government bodies
- Councils carry the cost
- Councils decide if they want a trial, Minister then selects
- No commitment beyond this trial, definitely no commitment to national general elections
- ➤ DIA Guide 125 requirements for local government to meet to carry out a trial – design, process, accessibility, security, audit, etc

Local Government Online Voting Trials



Wellington

Palmerston North

Masterton

Porirua

Selwyn



Christchurch

Dunedin

Hamilton

Waimakariri

Hurunui

Marlborough

Online council voting might expose us all



"Have you been having an affair?" asked Mary.

"Worse," replied John, "The hack was of the Wellington local body online voting. I've got a terrible confession to make."

Mary prepared for the worst. "I voted for Cella Wade-Brown," Would you really like the exact details of how you voted to be made public, Ashley Madison style?

undemocratic interests as well as

like the exact details of how you wised to be made public, Ashley Madison style? All those candidates to whom you promised your vote would find out that you did actually vote for them, though at No 9 on a list of 10.

What about people hacking into

be money well spent.

So can an IT system be developed that is completely fallsafe? Probably not. As an IT professional recently told me, it's relatively easy to develop systems that are very safe, but to make them 100 per cent safe can be

During the recount, "they got the paper ballots out and counted them in a courtroom, with a judge and scrutineers overseeing the process", explains McNie.

"Good luck with that when you have an online voting system, and malware to manipulate votes . . . is

Council votes for online election

JOEL MAXWELL

WELLINGTON has been warned it faces an Ashley Madison-style election hack as it opts for online voting for 2016.

In a split vote, councillors have agreed to join a trial of online voting for next year's election – despite warnings from IT experts about potential security risks.

At yesterday's extraordinary full council meeting, software developer Nigel McNie said online voting opened up the process to "massive risk" Selwyn to forge ahead with online voting despite security fears

Security fears end plans for online voting trial in Christchurch

Tech generation wants online voting

Marlborough rejects online voting 'experiment'

Online council voting might expose us all



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Where Parliament Fits



Opportunities for Online Parliamentary Plebiscites

- Greater focus on Parliament
- Engaging the disaffected
- More accurate than opinion polling
- Better informed than opinion polling
- Ability for MPs to test their ideas
- If seen as genuine consultation, translates to increased turnout at elections
- Could build on 2016 LG trial (if successful)

Challenges to Online Parliamentary Plebiscites


- ➤ If results seen as being ignored by MPs, then greater disengagement (see NZ CIR)
- Establishment costs would need to be in conjunction with Elections NZ – but ongoing cost relatively low
- Security failures set back the use of online voting, and voting more generally
- Choosing suitable topics / questions to engage
- Low online turnout could be seen as a failure (could be seen as an elitist pursuit)












Wisdom of crowds

<u>OR</u>

Hijacked as a joke



Engaging Parliament Through Internet Plebiscites

An idea worth developing

or

Idealistic – nice try but forget it